ABSTRACT This article explores the extent to which a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming is incorporated in the EU political discourse by analysing how family policy and gender inequality in politics are framed in EU policy documents. Gender mainstreaming is treated as an open signifier that can be filled with both feminist and non-feminist content. The article provides a set of criteria to assess whether a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming has been adopted. The frame analysis of EU documents on family policy and gender inequality in politics reveals but a partial adoption of a feminist understanding of gender mainstreaming and only in the area of gender inequality in politics.
INTRODUCTION
After more than a decade from its appearance in the EU political arena, gender mainstreaming has not been effectively implemented, in spite of its formal incorporation in the acquis communautaire (Behning and Serrano Pascual, 2001; Lombardo, 2005; Verloo, 2001; Walby, 2005) . Some theorists argue that barriers to gender mainstreaming are not due to a difficulty in assimilating the concept, but rather to the patriarchal opposition to
feminist goals implied in the strategy. The more radical 'agenda-setting' approach to gender mainstreaming has, in fact, the potential of challenging gendered roles, structures and policies and threatening EU patriarchal political contexts in which individual women and men act (Stratigaki, 2005) . Underlying this argument is the assumption that gender mainstreaming should challenge traditional gender roles from a feminist perspective.
The definition of gender mainstreaming of the Council of Europe is an empty signifier. It focuses on the procedural changes gender mainstreaming involves but does not address what we should understand by a gender equality perspective: 'the (re)organization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making' (Council of Europe, 1998: 15) .
The literature on gender and the EU has focused on a variety of aspects related to the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the EU political context (Hafner-Burton and Pollack, 2000; Hoskyns, 2004; Mazey, 2001) . In this article, we study in particular the extent to which a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming is incorporated in the EU political discourse. The assumption is that the impact that gender mainstreaming can have on the generation of a more gender-equal society depends on the way in which it is interpreted, and in particular on the extent to which a feminist interpretation of it infiltrates political debates.
The first section of this article provides a feminist definition of gender mainstreaming that is based on five shifts. To explore the extent to which a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming is taking place in the EU political discourse, we then analyse how family policy and gender inequality in politics are framed in the EU. Two reasons explain why we opt for these cases. First, a gender mainstreaming process is considered to be most easily launched in explicitly gendered issues rather than in topics where gender-related inequality is not immediately evident. Family policy and gender inequality in politics are explicitly gendered in the sense that the impact they have on women and men's social roles appears more visible than for other topics, such as agriculture or country planning. If explicitly gendered policy areas contain no traces of gender mainstreaming, this applies all the more to less explicitly gendered ones. Second, neither family policy nor gender inequality in politics really fall under the EU remit and the latter cannot formulate binding measures in either of them. We can expect more far-reaching and thus feminist readings of gender mainstreaming in areas where the EU can permit itself an empty rhetoric than where it has to take binding measures. However, if even documents regarding areas such as family policy and gender inequality in politics contain no such references, we could expect
other fields to reflect even fewer feminist readings of gender mainstreaming.
Both EU family policy and gender inequality in politics were cases in the larger MAGEEQ project studying how gender inequality as a policy problem is subject to a variety of interpretations that, consciously or unconsciously, affect the framing of public policies. 1 We studied the policy frames operating in a broad range of EU official policy documents, such as Council resolutions and recommendations, Commission decisions and communications and European Parliament (EP) resolutions and reports. Texts selected for the analysis also included speeches, press releases, research reports or awareness raising and documenting brochures written on behalf of the European institutions (see Appendix for the list of texts analysed). The starting point for our study was 1995, date of the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing, which strongly contributed to place gender mainstreaming on the agenda.
The second section of this article discusses theoretical and methodological aspects of frame analysis. In the remaining sections, we analyse how frames operating in EU policy documents on family policy and gender inequality in politics reflect a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming. In the conclusions, we examine the evidence of shifts towards a feminist understanding of gender mainstreaming in the selected policy areas and we draw implications for the incorporation of gender mainstreaming in the EU.
A FEMINIST DEFINITION OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING
At least five shifts in the policy-making process must be found to be able to say that a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming has been put into practice (Council of Europe, 1998; Lombardo, 2005; Meier, forthcoming) . The first is a shift in concepts underlying the policy-making process. Gender mainstreaming implies a shift towards a broader concept of gender equality, that explicitly targets patriarchy by tackling the multiple interconnected causes that create an unequal relation between the sexes in the areas of family, work, politics, sexuality, culture and male violence (Walby, 1990) . It requires a focus on gender and not only on women, which implies that changes in men's lifestyles are also necessary.
A second shift is the incorporation of a gender perspective into the mainstream political agenda. Reference to gender issues and considerations on how to limit the differential impact of provisions on women and men should be found in all policy areas. There must be evidence that the mainstream political agenda has been reoriented by rethinking and rearticulating policy ends and means from a gender perspective and prioritizing gender over competing objectives (Jahan, 1995) .
A third shift recommends an equal political representation of wo/men as a way to ensure that women will, at least numerically, be part of the mainstream. The feminist component involved in this shift is that it directly challenges the unequal gender distribution of resources and threatens men's political hierarchy. The power shift, however, does not simply rely on an increase in female numbers and rather lies in the challenging of the existing male norm upon which criteria for the attribution of values are based and political priorities are set.
A fourth shift concerns the institutional and organizational cultures of political decision-making, and requires changes in the policy-process, mechanisms and actors. This includes the acquisition of the necessary gender expertise, knowledge of the mechanism causing and reproducing gender inequality and of the means to solve it, including new policy tools.
A fifth shift towards a feminist model of gender mainstreaming requires both 'displacement' and 'empowerment' (Squires, 2005; Verloo, 2005b) . The strategy of displacement, by challenging the equality/difference dichotomy, opens the door to mainstreaming diversity rather than merely gender (Squires, 2005) . Verloo (2005b) argues that for mainstreaming to be a transformative feminist concept, it must be a strategy of both displacement and empowerment. This requires a space for the expression of continuous feminist struggles (Verloo, 2005b) . The fifth shift involves a greater participation of civil society, which is related to the feminist demand of creating 'velvet triangles' of empowerment to link the formal with the informal aspect of political action (Lycklama à Nijeholt et al., 1998; Woodward, 2004) .
These shifts leave no doubt about what has to be understood by the incorporation of a gender equality perspective in the mainstream. Gender mainstreaming is no longer an open signifier as it appeared in the definition of the Council of Europe (1998), but rather reflects concerns that are present in feminist agendas. In this article, we analyse the extent to which these shifts can be detected in EU policy documents on family policy and gender inequality in politics. We assume that gender mainstreaming can have a greater impact on the generation of a more gender-equal society to the extent that it is capable of incorporating feminist perspectives in the political debates.
GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND POLICY FRAME ANALYSIS
Drawing on the literature on social movements (Snow and Benford, 1988) , the MAGEEQ project has interpreted the concept of policy frame as an 'organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is European Journal of Women's Studies 13 (2) 
implicitly or explicitly included' (Verloo, 2005a) . A policy problem usually includes a diagnosis (what is the problem) and a prognosis (solution[s]) of the issue at stake. In the construction of policy problems, different interpretations can be made. For instance, gender inequality in politics can be represented as a problem of 'women lagging behind men' or of 'men dominating power positions and excluding women'. Theoretically, prognosis should correspond to diagnosis, so that solutions are adapted to the problems posed.
Within the dimensions of diagnosis and prognosis, there emerge implicit or explicit representations of who is deemed to hold the problem, who caused it and who should solve it, and to what extent gender and intersectionality (i.e. gender intersections with race, class, sexual orientation, ability, ethnic origin, religion, ideology) are related to the problem and its solution. 2 When analysing policy frames in gender equality policies, it is also relevant to identify who has a voice in defining problem and solution to see whether feminist actors are included.
All elements of diagnosis and prognosis contained in policy documents were listed and translated into frames. Some frames occurred more frequently than others, thus dominating or merely appearing in the texts. 3 Since we were interested in how gender inequality as a policy problem is subject to a variety of interpretations, the selection of documents was based on the construction of a time-line that identified key moments throughout the period of study. Texts were added until they did not include any new substantial information.
By applying frame analysis to family policy and gender inequality in politics, we have identified the frames operating in these EU policy documents. We searched for elements of a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming in such documents by analysing to what extent the five shifts defined in the previous section can be found in the frames operating within these policy areas.
POLICY FRAMES IN EU FAMILY POLICY AND GENDER INEQUALITY IN POLITICS 4
EU diagnostic and prognostic frames on family policy and gender inequality in politics present evidence of shifts towards a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming and at the same time inconsistencies and ambiguities that challenge such a feminist potential (see Table 1 for the frames and the Appendix for the occurrence of frames per document).
The most frequent diagnostic frames identified in family policy concern reconciliation problems and women's access to the labour market. These co-occur with a less dominant frame on the persistence of gender inequality. Other less dominant frames refer to demographic changes, changes in
the composition of families and the fact that family policies fail. A weak frame, found only in one text, deals with poverty. Except for the last two, all frames found in diagnosis have a matching frame in prognosis, with a strong dominance of the issue of reconciliation. In prognosis, labour market and gender equality issues are less dominant. Weak frames in the prognosis of EU family policy documents are demographic changes and failing family policies.
EU diagnostic frames in gender inequality in politics can be grouped in three areas: the first includes representational issues and the lack of institutional responses to the problem, and frames the problem predominantly in quantitative terms; the second refers to gender inequality in politics as a problem related to other structural inequalities mainly located in the 
labour market; the third includes frames that express broader questions of gender inequality, such as the existence of male domination and patriarchy hindering women's political representation. Prognostic frames include quotas for women in politics, changing electoral rules, changing the sexual division of labour, creating velvet triangles of empowerment, mainstreaming gender and monitoring progress on women in politics.
A Focus on Women, not on Gender or Intersectionality
Both policy issues mainly focus on women, and if they pay attention to men, they do it differently. Gender inequality in politics frames women as the main problem-holders, while men rarely appear as causing or holding the problem of gender inequality in politics. There exists a diagnostic frame about the problem of male domination, though it is weak and expressed only by gender advocates. But there is no matching frame in prognosis about changing male political elite. This creates a potential conflict with the dominant prognostic frame on increasing the number of women through quotas. The absence of a parallel discourse on the changes to the male political elite required for 'letting' more women enter in elected and decision-making bodies shows that, although male domination is deemed problematic, no appeal to male change is made. To 'encourage women' is an ambiguous message, which provides women with resources for entering politics, but reveals a patronizing idea that women need support, while men do not need training and information on the causes of male domination in politics, its effects on women or the development of more gender-equal attitudes. The premises to challenge male power appear weaker when women are also depicted as 'not making it in politics', in which case they even lack the quality of the 'male active citizen' to initiate a process of change.
The existence of competing premises is important for understanding potential dangers in the implementation of policy measures. Gender inequality in politics is mainly articulated as a quantitative issue, but this takes us in opposing directions. Quotas are effective in increasing the number of women and challenging male power positions. In this sense, they are a feminist solution to the problem, as it is argued in the third shift of a feminist definition of gender mainstreaming. However, the effect could also be the opposite of feminist, as a number-driven solution could degender and depoliticize the issue, treating it as a problem of achieving target figures, rather than changing power relations.
In family policies, the focus is on women, while men are not addressed. Women are thought to face a problem of reconciliation, which then generates a demographic deficit, a lack of labour force supply and changes in family life. Men and the gendered distribution of tasks in the sphere of intimacy are not part of the diagnosis and prevailing gender roles are left
unchallenged. The fact that women share the burden of reconciliation is accepted as the norm, since the focus is on how women could better reconcile work and care. EU family policy documents allude to men, mentioning the issue of a balance of men and women in work and care. But statements are vague and the rest of the diagnosis and prognosis is not framed in accordance with this.
EU documents on family policies, and partially also on gender inequality in politics, are gender-blind. They limit diagnosis and prognosis to a focus on women as a social category and lack a broader approach to gender (including men's roles) tackling the interconnected causes that create an unequal relation between the sexes to the disadvantage of women, as the first shift suggests.
Even more blind appear EU documents when intersectionality is considered. Women are presented as a homogeneous category without race, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, ability or any other life dimension experienced by the subject cross-cutting it. A marginal reference to class can be found in the rare frame on poverty identified in family policy texts. This reveals a lack of interest for mainstreaming diversity, as recommended in the fifth shift. Furthermore, the failure to incorporate the perspectives and experiences of diverse groups in the selected policy texts indicates that these subjects have no voice, and thus no political power, to frame the problem of and solution to gender inequality.
The Rhetoric of Substantive Equality
EU documents on family policies do not involve a move towards gender equality, but limit themselves to equal opportunities. Notwithstanding the rhetoric, they reproduce and consolidate women's roles as primary caregivers. The gender equality frame, for instance, focuses on equal opportunities and mainly addresses gender relations in the labour market. It usually leaves aside gender relations in the organization of intimacy. The orientation towards an equal opportunities approach in the labour market facilitates a focus on a non-feminist perception of reconciliation. While the labour market and the reconciliation frames are of political priority, the gender equality frame fulfils a mere rhetorical function.
Ambiguities also appear in frames found in the issue of gender inequality in politics. The lack of women in decision-making is interpreted as a waste of human resources. This utilitarian discourse can be a 'strategic framing' to introduce the issue in non-feminist environments, but it can also degender it, since the goal is efficiency rather than gender equality. The premises for both goals, an efficient use of human resources and a gender-equal society, can be competing.
Overall, there is no shift towards gender equality, and this is not prioritized in family policies or in gender inequality of politics. For the
latter, the lack of priority of gender equality appears in the rhetoric unaccompanied by binding measures. This is the case for prognostic frames about quotas, targets, regulation, change in political culture and even Europeanization, where the EU is supposed to act on member states but not through binding measures. EU family policies seem more concerned with macroeconomic issues and demographics than gender equality (Stratigaki, 2004) . Whenever there are competing policy objectives, the issue of gender equality loses the battle. Gender objectives are not prioritized among competing issues, as shift two of a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming would require.
Feminist Frames and their Inconsistencies
Unlike the case of family policies, gender inequality in politics presents a few 'feminist' frames. In diagnosis, frames on electoral systems and failing institutional measures analyse structural obstacles to women's political representation. These match with prognostic frames proposing a structural transformation of polity and electoral rules. There are references to a broader approach to gender inequality that sees the gender division of labour and male domination as obstacles to women's political equality.
Diagnostic frames on the existence of a sex division of labour and male domination hint at the first shift towards a broader concept of gender equality. Frames on gender-biased electoral systems, the need for regulation and the failure of institutional measures whose diagnosis matches the prognosis of the problem partially tackle the second shift on incorporating a gender perspective in the mainstream agenda. However, they do not give priority to gender objectives in terms of binding measures, which limits the occurrence of the second shift.
Although the third shift towards an equal representation of women is explicitly tackled in the frames on gender inequality in politics, the feminist potential of the latter for challenging male political power remains ambiguous, as argued earlier. Evidence of a fourth shift in institutional and organizational culture concerning gender expertise and the use of tools is provided by the frames on monitoring progress of women in politics (i.e. sex-disaggregated data to assess women's position in politics) and gender mainstreaming (conceived as a procedural tool that requires indicators for follow-up and gender statistics). The frame on the velvet triangles of empowerment (institutional cooperation with women's movements) addresses the fifth shift. Nonetheless, both the rarity of the frame and the absence of diversity mainstreaming reveal merely a partial shift towards 'displacement' and 'empowerment'.
The feminist frames found are not immune from inconsistencies. The diagnostic frame on the existence of male domination has no corresponding solution, the prognostic frame on 'change division of labour'
maintains women as the main actors of reconciliation, and the prognostic frames on 'change societal inequality' and 'party responsibility' sound rhetorical as no concrete measures are proposed. The rare prognostic frame on 'gender mainstreaming' treats the strategy like an open signifier mainly concerned with procedural matters that do not challenge a hierarchical gender distribution of power.
Feminist frames rarely occur and, when they do, they tend to be voiced by gender advocates: the EP Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality, gender experts and the European Women's Lobby. The rare presence of gender experts and the almost non-existent voice of feminist movements in official texts means that the contribution they could offer to the framing of the problem and solution of gender inequality in politics is de facto limited.
Though rare and inconsistent, feminist frames on gender inequality in politics are present in the EU policy documents. By contrast, EU documents on family policies do not contain frames revealing a shift towards a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming.
CONCLUSIONS
The EU texts on family policies contain no shift towards a feminist definition of gender mainstreaming. Evidence of a non-feminist reading can be found in the framing of the issue as a problem for women, that women should solve, while men are not part of the problem, nor asked to change. While the problem of reconciliation is dominant in diagnosis, the gendered division of labour is not tackled. Instead, this division is confirmed in the prognosis, through a focus on how women could better reconcile care and work. The male norm is not deconstructed, the aim is to have more women in the labour market, whereas allusions to men's intervention in the domestic sphere remain vague (shifts one and three).
In the documents on family policy, moreover, there is no incorporation of a gender perspective in the agenda capable of challenging power hierarchies and reorienting policy ends and means, nor a sign that gender equality objectives have been prioritized. References to gender equality fulfil a rhetorical function, as demographic and socioeconomic concerns prevail (shift two). Similarly, references to the institutional and organizational cultures of political decision-making and changes in the policy process, mechanisms and actors are missing (shifts four and five). The marginal reference to class found in the poverty frame reflects a rhetorical rather than a profound concern for cross-cutting gender and class or for incorporating diversity (shift five). The window-dressing function of the frame also appears from the lack of a matching prognosis on how to resolve problems of poverty.
P R O O F O N L Y
Contrary to EU texts on family policies, those on gender inequality in politics present some evidence of shifts towards a feminist definition of gender mainstreaming. Women's equal quantitative representation in politics is the most occurring frame. Despite the importance of numbers and data, a mere quantitative shift not supported by shifts in power, concepts and political priorities may risk causing a negative, retroactive effect on the goal of gender equality, as the change required is more complex than a shift in numbers may suggest (shift three). Diagnostic frames on patriarchy or male domination hint at a focus on gender instead of women. Nevertheless, they lack a prognostic frame and thus a full feminist reading of gender mainstreaming as long as the male standard is not addressed (shift one).
Frames on gender-biased electoral systems, the need for regulation and the failure of institutional measures incorporate a gender perspective in the mainstream agenda. However, no priority is given to gender objectives in terms of binding measures (shift two). Changes in the policy process and mechanisms are marginally touched by the collection of data to monitor progress of women in politics (shift four). The same goes for the implication of a broader range of actors, visible in the feminist frame on the 'triangle of empowerment'. However, the issue of diversity is not addressed at all (fifth shift).
Shifts are only present in one issue and in limited terms and they mainly deal with numbers and data on women's progress. This can indicate that the move towards gender mainstreaming tends to privilege more 'simple' issues like numbers, a minimum common denominator easier to agree on that requires no particular gender knowledge, rather than more complex and potentially controversial issues such as the challenging of power hierarchies, gender roles and political agenda that a feminist reading of gender mainstreaming would require. Even explicitly gendered policy issues such as gender inequality in politics are not immune to the pitfalls of simplistic readings of gender or to gender stereotypes. The lack of any feminist reading of gender mainstreaming in EU documents on family policy also shows that even explicitly gendered policy areas are not necessarily framed in a feminist way, even when the policy competencies allow for non-binding rhetoric.
We draw different implications from this analysis. First, gender mainstreaming is an open signifier that can be filled with both feminist and non-feminist meanings. Thus, it is important to make premises about policy-makers' interpretation of gender (in)equality more explicit to minimize ambiguities. Second, if gender mainstreaming is not framed in a feminist way even in gendered issues such as family policies and gender inequality in politics where the limited EU competence should allow for non-binding rhetoric, meagre results are to be expected from its application to other policy areas. Third, the fact that inconsistencies appear in
all frames, even in the most feminist ones articulated by gender policy experts, should make us reflect on the more or less implicit gender bias embedded in the policy formulation of gender equality policies, to avoid the latter falling into the trap of being infiltrated by sexist prejudices, such as the attribution of the problem to women only and the absence of a call for change in men. Fourth, the awareness of inconsistencies can be a powerful tool for sharpening the formulation of gender policies. This could help policy-makers avoid the formulation of unbalanced policies towards the solution, which do not make a thorough diagnosis of the problem, or that provide a more comprehensive diagnosis of the problem but then give solutions that contribute to perpetuate traditional gender roles, or whose goal is different from the achievement of a gender-equal society. Fifth, the lack of references to intersectionality and the modest space given to civil society and the feminist movements in the selected EU texts is matter for reflecting on the possible causes of the non-feminist reading of gender mainstreaming. Finally, the fact that the few feminist frames found are linked to the voice of gender advocates inside and outside the EU institutions should make us think of how we can make these voices stronger than they presently are. [Quantitative representation; male domination; democracy; equality; electoral system; change rules of politics; party responsibility; change sex division of labour; encourage women; change polity; change political culture; monitor progress; gender mainstreaming] NOTES 1.
APPENDIX: LIST OF ANALYSED TEXTS

EU Documents on Gender Inequality in Politics and their Policy Frames
The MAGEEQ project, 'Policy Frames and Implementation Problems: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming', is financed by the Fifth EU programme for scientific research. It studies the EU, Austrian, Dutch, Greek, Hungarian, Slovenian and Spanish policies in the areas of family policies, gender inequality in politics, domestic violence, migration, homosexual rights and anti-discrimination. For more details, see www.mageeq.net 2.
The frame analysis developed by the MAGEEQ project also related the analysis of diagnosis and prognosis to the mechanisms considered to
